The present paper is intended as a cross-linguistic study of the range of possible realizations of instructional speech acts as a special type of directives, as realized in the domain of cooking recipes. Even a cursory comparison of orders as directive speech acts across languages brings to light an extreme degree of variation concerning their formal realization. While imperatives are virtually the only possibility in English, a contrastive linguistic perspective reveals that other construction types are attested in other languages, instead, or in addition to the imperative. The central goal of the present paper is to shed light on the motives for these intralingual and interlingual similarities. The data from Germanic, Romance, Slavic languages, and Hungarian are analyzed against the background of the speech-act scenario model, and then discussed with the help of two cultural models of HELP, which are claimed to provide the basis for the motivation of the cross-linguistic distribution of various constructions.
Introduction
The present paper is intended as a cross-linguistic study of the range of possible realizations of instructional speech acts as a special type of directives, as realized in the domain of cooking recipes. Even a cursory comparison of orders as directive speech acts across languages brings to light an extreme degree of variation concerning their formal realization. What is more, an amazing degree of variation can also be perceived within languages. As obligative directive speech acts (cf. Dirven and Verspoor 1998: 156 for the modification of Searle's original typology, lumping his five speech acts into three superordinate categories, i.e. informative speech acts, comprising assertive speech acts, as well as information questions; obligative, comprising directives and commissives; and constitutive speech acts: comprising expressives and declaratives), requests are prototypically realized as imperative sentences. Cf. the following English example:
(1) Close the door! However, there is a whole gamut of other more or less indirect strategies, ranging in form from yes/no questions with modals to declaratives or exclamatives:
(2) Could/Would you close the door? (3) Can't/Won't you close the door? (4) I would be grateful if you could close the door! (5) It would be great if you could/closed the door! (6) I wanted/was going to ask you to close the door.
However, not all obligative speech acts exhibit this degree of variation. It appears that the less obligative they are, the more uniform their expression tends to be. Commissives thus typically contain modals will or shall, although they can also be realized as self-reminders with other modals or quasi-modals (e.g. I must check it, or I'd better check it up, cited in Bilbow 2002: 297) .
In this paper we are concerned with instructional speech acts as a particular type of directives that occur in specialized types of discourse, such as manuals or cooking recipes, both belonging to what is often called procedural genre (Taavitsainen 2001 ), or appellative (cf. Bergs 2007 . Specifically, we will take a closer look at the grammatical realization of instructional speech acts in cooking recipes, which tend to be more uniform in this respect. Cf. the following English example which contains only imperatives as instructional speech acts:
Data
The first part of this cross-linguistic research is based on the corpus consisting of seven translations of Kleines Ungarisches Kochbuch (Little Hungarian Cookery Book), a collection of cooking recipes published by Károly Gundel, the son of János Gundel who founded the famous Gundel restaurant in Budapest in 1910. It was originally published in 1934 in German, and nowadays its translations into Hungarian, English, German, French, Italian, Spanish and Russian are available as parallel texts. The fact that a series of recipes is thus made available for contrastive analyses of parallel mini-corpora means that we could use both the translational and statistical equivalence as the tertium comparationis (cf. Krzeszowski on the notion of statistical equivalence in contrastive linguistics).
What we have found is a fairly high degree of uniformity concerning the dominant formal expression in instructional speech acts in the above cookery books. The constructions listed in Table 1 are found in all the recipes in the given language. The second part of our cross-linguistic research is an analysis of various translationally non-equivalent collections of recipes, found in cookery books, printed magazines as well as in their online editions, or in online collections of recipes. They mostly contain original recipes for dishes typical of particular linguistic communities represented in our study. In this way, we not only also offset possible interference from the source language (German) in various translations of the cookery book by Gundel, but also check the range of possible variation in both an intralingual and interlingual perspective. Here we also extend the range of languages, adding Dutch, and several Slavic languages: Slovene, Slovakian, Czech, Polish, Croatian, Macedonian and Bulgarian. We took note of the number of construction types and the frequency with which individual construction types were attested. The results of this cross-linguistic comparison are given in Table 2 below. As in the majority of languages only a fairly limited repertoire of constructions were attested; we only present here the three most important ones (that we found to be the most frequent in our samples), although occasionally more than three types of constructions were used. Thus, in the concluding part of Section 3 below we discuss the situation in Polish, which also uses infinitive constructions. 
Analysis and discussion
As might have been expected, imperative constructions are used in a large number of languages for instructions in cooking recipes. However, there is a whole range of indirect instructions, realized by means of various syntactic constructions. These indirect instructions are in some of the languages a default choice, in some virtually the only choice. In this section we would like to consider the possibility of motivating the observed distribution of grammatical constructions used in the expression of the indirect instructional speech act in recipes, using the speech act scenario model developed by Panther and Thornburg (1998) as the background.
As is well known, indirect speech acts have been discussed widely. In a classical Searlean account, indirect speech acts are speech acts by which the speaker appears to perform a speech act A (a primary speech act), while actually performing another speech act B (a secondary speech act). In other words, this is a speech act "performed by means of another" (Cf. Searle 1979: 60) .
The crux of the problem is, according to Searle, as follows: How does the speaker understand the nonliteral primary illocutionary act from understanding the literal secondary illocutionary act? What he proposes is a sequence of steps in reconstructing the primary speech act. The problem with these is that, although the individual steps are supposed to be unconscious, the nonliteral primary act is somehow derived from the literal secondary act. Some other accounts, e.g. Grice (1975) , Bach and Harnish (1979) , or Sperber and Wilson (1986) also assume that the hearer can infer the indirect speech act, i.e. arrive at the proper interpretation of its propositional contents and illocutionary force by going through several steps in which inferential rules are ordered.
More recently, a more radical approach has been advanced in cognitive linguistics, the interpretation of indirect speech acts being based on the activation of a certain part of a cognitive model. Specifically, the interpretation of the indirect speech act is based on the metonymic evocation of the whole model or one of its parts through a previous activation of another part of the model. This idea about the metonymic motivation of indirect speech acts, first formulated by Gibbs (1994: 351ff.) , 2 has been worked out in more detail in a series of studies, especially by Panther and Thornburg. Their speech act scenario model (Thornburg and Panther 1997 , Panther and Thornburg 1998 , 1999 is the most elaborate account of the role of metonymy in indirect speech acts. In what follows we will concentrate on the speech act scenario approach to speech acts, because it can easily be employed in cross-linguistic studies.
The speech act scenario model by Panther and Thornburg is based on the assumption that any element of an illocutionary scenario or a speech act scenario can stand metonymically for the whole of the associated illocutionary category. The central component of the model is the idea that our knowledge about illocutionary categories is organized in the form of so-called illocutionary scenarios as information package, stored in our long-term memory, and accessible to all members of a linguistic community, so that a brief hint at a particular component of the associated scenario suffices to activate the whole illocutionary category, or at least to point in its direction. The model can be demonstrated on a simplified REQUEST scenario ( Starting from this scenario for REQUEST, Panther and Thornburg assume that instances of indirect REQUESTS, such as the examples in (10) and (11), can be understood without problems due to the fact they activate certain components of the above scenario.
(10) Will you close the door? (11) Can you pass the salt?
The utterance in (10) is a conventionalized expression in English, used in order to realize a request. One component of the illocutionary scenario for REQUEST, viz. the question about the future action of the hearer, stands here for the request to H is under an obligation to do A (H must/should/ought to do A) (iii) The AFTER: H will do A perform a given action. Example (10) is referred to by Panther und Thornburg (1998) as "a pragmatic substitute for the explicit request Close the door."
The component H will do A as part of the scenario for REQUEST is so close to the CORE component that it can activate the whole scenario. The modal auxiliary can in (11) links the utterance to the information in the BEFORE component, viz. the precondition for the sequence of actions of the whole scenario, so that the illocutionary category REQUEST is activated.
In what follows we sketch the structure of INSTRUCTIONs, using the speech act scenario model. As we stated at the beginning, we are concerned here with cooking recipes as an instance of the INSTRUCTIONAL speech act. The illocutionary scenario for INSTRUCTIONS in cooking recipes is shown in Fig. 2 . The hearer (=H) cannot perform the sequence of actions. The speaker (=S) can perform the sequence of actions. H wants to learn how to perform the sequence of actions. S wants H to be able to perform the sequence of actions. S will teach H to how to perform the sequence of actions.
(ii) The CORE: S invites H to replicate his/her actions and focus his/her Attention on performing the sequence of actions.
RESULT: H is not obliged to follow what S does.
H is able/free to replicate the actions by S by focusing his/her attention on the sequence of actions, but s/he is free to stop performing the sequence at any time.
(iii) The AFTER or CONSEQUENCE: H can perform the sequence of actions. H can replicate the sequence of actions at his/her convenience.
Applying this model to the data presented in Section 2, we realize that the intralingual constancy of the expressions in the sense that in the majority of cases we find the imperative or the infinitive can be motivated against the background of the speech act scenario. The metonymic activation of whole indirect speech acts within the scenario model is explained by the fact that the activation of a (part) component of a scenario makes it possible to activate automatically or inferentially other or even all the components of the same scenario.
The preparatory conditions for instructions are similar to those for orders and commands (Searle, 1969: 64) . Specifically, in our case the author of a recipe appears to be in a position of authority over the reader in terms of knowledge and experience. Secondly, the reader is able to do the actions stated in the instructions. The things are somewhat less clear concerning the sincerity condition (the speaker normally wants the ordered act done). The author/writer of the recipe will only write instructions that are critical to follow in order to produce the desired result, a given dish.
As far as the productivity of illocutionary metonymies is concerned, Panther and Thornburg put forward the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1
The more distant a speech act scenario component is from the CORE, the weaker is its ability to evoke the scenario metonymically. In other words, the more conceptually removed a component is from the CORE, the less likely that component will be in a stand for (metonymic) relation to the scenario as a whole. (Panther & Thornburg 1998: 761) 
Hypothesis 2
The more components of a scenario present in a discourse, the easier it is to identify the scenario and the more likely even a relatively peripheral component can stand metonymically for the scenario. (Panther & Thornburg 1998: 768) In what follows, we take a closer look at the instructional speech act from a contrastive linguistic point of view and test the two hypotheses by Panther and Thornburg. Generally, we can say that the imperative constructions represent the CORE of instructions. It is, of course, not surprising that the imperative constructions are the most widely used construction in cooking recipes. Similarly, Sarmento (2005) finds that imperatives are probably the most frequent ways in which instructions are performed in aviation manuals.
We also note that cooking recipes are devoid of any kind of politeness strategies. It is obvious that instructions in recipes can be performed bald-onrecord, and do not need any explicit mitigating devices, such as please, as they are not FTAs (face-threatening acts). Since instructionals, unlike requests, do belong to the obligative speech acts, and since H can act at his/her own convenience, this scenario lacks all the unpleasant aspects linked to a face-threat or immediate sanctions (possibly by S) if H fails to respond appropriately. On the one hand, the writer and the readers of cooking recipes belong to what Swales (1990) defines as Discourse Communities (DCs), i.e. groups of people who link up in order to pursue objectives that are prior to those of socialization and solidarity, even if these latter should consequently occur " (1990: 24) . On the other, the instructions in cooking recipes are performed for the reader's own good. According to Brown and Levinson, "[s] peaker and hearer both tacitly agree that the relevance of face may be suspended in the interests of urgency or efficiency " (1987: 69) . In other words, as the interaction is so focused on the task at hand, face redress seems to be irrelevant. Leech (1983: 84) claims that "politeness is largely irrelevant in collaborative illocutionary functions, such as instructions."
It follows from this lack of face-threat that one can in principle go directly to the core of the speech act scenario. This explains the cross-linguistic constancy of expression, i.e. the domination of the imperative construction and is in agreement with Hypothesis 1. What remains to be explained are cross-linguistic differences, i.e. the range of variation found across languages. While it is not surprising that imperatives are so common in cooking recipes, it is nevertheless surprising that they are not used in the same way in all the languages in the sample. More specifically, we would need to answer the question about the lack of imperative constructions in cooking recipes in certain languages, in spite of their belonging universally to the CORE component of the scenario in question.
According to Hypothesis 2, one would expect that peripheral components should also be used metonymically for the whole speech act scenario because cooking recipes as a genre typically contain numerous components of the scenario (e.g. the name of the dish, ingredients, cooking methods, and often even illustrations of various stages in the preparation). This, however, cannot be invoked to explain the cross-linguistic differences. There are languages in our sample which exhibit only the constructions belonging to the CORE, while there are also languages which rely on more peripheral components. It appears that the explanation cannot be cast exclusively in terms of the most immediate pragmatic and cognitive factors, but rather in terms of their interplay with some structural givens of these languages as well as some further cognitive factors that are hidden beyond the surface.
Generalizing the results given in Table 2 , we can observe the following:
• The imperative constructions occupy the topmost position in roughly two thirds of the languages studied here. Other constructions found as the first choice are the infinitive construction (13.3% of the languages), the impersonal reflexive construction (13.3%), and the 1 st person plural of the present indicative (13.3%).
• Further, we have also found that the second most frequent construction in 5 languages is the infinitive construction (in other words, in 33% of the languages investigated). In 2 other languages the second choice is 1 st person plural of the present indicative (13.3%), while 3 rd person plural of the present indicative and 1 st person plural imperative are both found in one language (6.6%).
• The third most frequent construction in language is 1 st person singular of the present indicative and imperative, both occurring in one language (6.6%).
Weighting these differences in the frequency (by assigning 3 points to the most frequent construction, 2 to the second most frequent, and 1 point to the third most frequent construction, and distinguishing between 2 nd person and 1 st person imperatives) we arrive at the following relevance scale: The following tendencies can be detected in this list: This list seems to indicate, roughly speaking, four ways of conceptualizing INSTRUCTIONS. They can be arranged along a scale of cooperativity and solidarity between the speaker and the hearer. On the one end of the scale we have maximal cooperativity and solidarity, on the other we find the minimum, with variable degrees of both in between.
The infinitive constructions (G) mark the end of the scale that is characterized by the least degree of presupposed cooperation and solidarity. Note that the series of infinitives can do no more than just sketch the sequence of actions that are the subject matter of instructions. Infinitive sentences typically do not contain the subject, but there are also other elements that might be ellipted, notably objects and adverbials. When we thus have a series of infinitive forms of verbs they may be coordinated (with all but the last coordinator omitted), or appear as separate clauselike structures (often in numbered sections). In both cases, direct objects and adverbials (of manner, etc.) may be shared by all the coordinated infinitives, or apply to only one. Further, a number of topics may be introduced, and it is not always clear how they relate within the recipe. This potential ambiguity is what we mean here by lack of full cooperation on the part of the speaker.
At the other end of the scale (marked as stage A in Fig. 3 below) , we have the inclusive 1 st person plural present indicative constructions. They conceptualize the instruction as a joint activity and therefore strongly indicate a very high degree of cooperation and solidarity between the speaker and the hearer. Stage B is represented by the inclusive 1 st person plural imperative construction, both speaker-and hearer-directed, which conceptualize the instruction as a request for a joint activity. Stage C is represented by 1 st person singular present indicative, which conceptualizes the instruction as a self description of an exemplary activity. Stage D is exactly in the middle of the scale: 2 nd person singular imperative construction, conceptualizing the instructions as a request for an action, appealing to the CORE component of the speech act scenario. The remaining three stages, E-G, are associated with various indirect and impersonal constructions in which the instruction conceptualized in terms of a gradual reduction to a series of actions. The last stage, G, is represented by infinitive constructions. These stages of the scale of cooperativity and solidarity are given in Fig. 3 below. The languages included in our sample also lend themselves to positioning along this scale. In the majority of languages, the constructions employed in the 15 languages in question can be 
Apparently, the inclusion of Polish data upsets an otherwise idyllic picture in that it also uses the infinitive construction in addition to the imperatives and present indicative. If it were not for the infinitive, it would be very similar to Hungarian, Slovakian and Czech. If we take a closer look at Polish data, it turns out that B and G do not enjoy the same status as A, C and D. According to I. Witczak-Plisiecka (p.c.), A and C, together with D represent the traditional way of presenting instructions in recipes in Polish. The other two, B and G, seem less frequent and more modern. This seems to be corroborated by some informal counts that we performed by googling certain collocations.
What is more, I. Witczak-Plisiecka pointed out to us that the infinitives in cooking recipes are often not pure but accompanied by some modal verbs. The recipe opens with a modal trzeba "should" with an infinitive, followed by another infinitive in the same sentence, and a series of infinitives throughout the text, all of which can be easily interpreted as being within the scope of the modal. Similarly, in example (13) The recipe switches from trzeba to muszę "must," and back to trzeba, followed by infinitives in coordinated clauses. Note also that the modal verbs in question are impersonal, which makes the construction similar to the impersonal reflexive constructions (F) employed by Macedonian and Bulgarian, which lack infinitives. However, infinitives are also found on their own: The tendency to reduce modal infinitive sequences to just infinitives may perhaps be attributed to the contact with German, and now also to the global influence of English.
Returning now to the taxonomy of speech act metonymies proposed by Panther and Thornburg (1997: 213ff) , the following tendencies can be observed:
• the metonymy of the type BEFORE COMPONENT FOR THE WHOLE SCENARIO is characteristic of stages A, B and C.
• the metonymy of the type CORE COMPONENT FOR THE WHOLE SCENARIO is characteristic of Stage D • the metonymy of the type AFTER COMPONENT FOR THE WHOLE SCENARIO is characteristic of stages E, F and G Summing up what we have established so far, we can say that is of course not surprising that the imperative constructions are the most widely used constructions in cooking recipes. What is, however, surprising is that imperatives are not used in the same way in all the languages in the sample, i.e. that some languages go out of their way in using a whole range of other constructions, instead of or in addition to imperatives. We have also associated these construction types with various stages of the cooperativity scale as well as with the three components of the metonymic speech act scenario. Finally, Polish data in particular have shown that languages are "free" to employ all three submetonymies, while somehow they generally fail to do so. In short, the answer to the motivation question is so far only "skin-deep." We can say that languages can choose between the BEFORE, the CORE or the AFTER component as the metonymic source, but we have not provided any explanation of why they should tend to choose one rather than the other, or perhaps two of these but not the third, or perhaps all the three. When these submetonymies are tied to the degrees of cooperativity and solidarity, we might think we have come somewhat closer to a "deeper" motivation. Recalling, however, that instructions in recipes can be safely performed bald-on-record, and that they actually do not need any explicit mitigating devices, such as please, as they are not FTAs (facethreatening acts), we are still puzzled about why some language nevertheless go out of their way in order to avoid imperatives. In other words, we should continue to "dig for some deeper motivation." In the remaining part of the present paper we propose where such deeper motivation can be found. In the course of this search, we have to pay due attention to some metatheoretical and methodological considerations. We start by briefly discussing the notion of motivation in (cognitive) linguistics.
In search of a "deeper motivation"
Motivation of linguistic phenomena, although it is, informally speaking, a relatively simple task of searching for some meaningful links between linguistic expressions and their contents and contexts of usage, and therefore an integral part of any linguistic enterprise, turns out, when it comes to its execution, to be largely a matter of ideological position. What is actually meant by motivation is determined by one's language philosophy and the actual grammatical model adopted.
In a generatively-oriented model, the task is reduced to establishing the set of possible constructions (sentences, utterances, etc.) , and thus indirectly a set of impossible ones, as well. It could also be the other way round; it may set itself as its goal the specification of the set of constraints which filter out the unacceptable constructions, as, for example, within the framework of Optimality Theory. The real motivating force in such a model resides in the component(s) containing constraints and is thus model-internal.
Cognitively and functionally oriented linguists seem to have reached a broad consensus on the issue of motivation with respect to at least two of its aspects (cf. Lakoff 1987 , Langacker 1987 , Haiman 1980 . First, motivation is a phenomenon exhibited by a range of linguistic structures that are neither wholly arbitrary nor fully predictable. Motivation is also seen as a matter of degree. Cf. Langacker (1987: 48) and Lakoff (1987: 346 and 493) , who speak of levels of predictability and relative motivation leading to restricted predictions, respectively. Second, linguistic structures seem to be chiefly motivated by interplay of external factors such as cognitive structures and communicative needs. As Lakoff (1987: 539) puts it:
People seem to learn and remember highly motivated expressions better than unmotivated expressions. We thus hypothesize that the degree of motivation of a grammatical system is a measure of the cognitive efficiency of that system relative to the concepts the system expresses.
Bybee (1985) is similarly of the opinion that, as far as grammaticalization processes are concerned, only cognitive processes can have any motivating force. Hopper and Traugott (1993: 67) concur with this position and suggest that communication strategies "draw upon general cognitive processes." However, cognitive linguists have always been aware that although the story which seemed complex turns out to be relatively simple, the whole story can be more complicated for at least two reasons. For one thing, cognitive structures and communicative factors need not work in unison. They are on occasion even likely to work in quite opposite directions. The expressive power of a language, defined informally as "the collection of concepts in that conceptual system that the language can distinctively express" (Lakoff 1987: 539) may be constrained to a degree by some requirements of communication. The principle of economy, at work in processes such as routinization and idiomatization of expressions, leads to simplicity, i.e. minimal differentiation of linguistic expressions. Languages can thus be regarded as "gigantic expression-compressing machines" (Langacker 1977: 106) .
The fact that one set of these factors may gain primacy over the other in different languages in general and/or in specific linguistic structures, may help determine the shape of smaller or larger portions of the grammatical systems involved. Indeed, we are going to see how large areas of language, but of course not all of it, are ultimately motivated by the facts of human embodiment and environment, i.e. by how these are reflected in cognitive structures, primarily through mechanisms such as conceptual metaphors and metonymies. However, the human environment may be brought into relation with language structures in an even less mediated way, i.e. some parallels between the two can be perceived and reflected in the latter in a more direct fashion, perhaps aided only by most rudimentary analogical reasoning. In cases of such diagrammatic relation between language and the objective world, we speak of iconicity.
The other element that complicates the picture is the source of cross-linguistic differences. Cognitive as well as functional linguists seem to have concentrated so far primarily on cross-linguistic similarities. One of the core assumptions in cognitive linguistics is that large areas of language are motivated by the facts of human embodiment (physical, cognitive and social), i.e. by how these are reflected in cognitive structures, primarily through mechanisms such as conceptual metaphors and metonymies. So far, cognitive linguists have "naturally" exhibited more interest in demonstrating cross-linguistic similarities. If much of what we consider to be the central facts of human embodiment is shared by humans, and is therefore universal, we should expect human languages to be, if not the same, then at least extremely similar. In actual fact, the cognitive linguistic success in uncovering all that "hidden" systematicity and universality was long (and often still is) advertised as one of its major comparative advantages over other approaches. However, it seems that this bias towards stressing the universal aspects of language, often based on conscious introspection and decontextualized data, which appears to have been necessary while cognitive linguistic movement was establishing and profiling itself against the background of the formal-generative framework from which it emerged on the one hand, and emancipating itself from the then prevalent objectivist philosophical atmosphere in and around linguistics, has now gradually come to be felt to be a potential obstacle to the development of cognitive linguistics.
If both cognitive structures and communicative needs are assumed to be universal and more or less shared by humans, e.g. metonymy and metaphor indeed seem to be universal phenomena, we should expect human languages to be, if not the same, then at least extremely similar. However, while some linguistic phenomena are ubiquitous, many others are specific to only some languages. Obviously, the picture painted by the simple interplay of cognitive structures and communicative needs lacks certain crucial details, some of which may be supplied by detailed cross-linguistic comparisons.
There is no doubt that metonymy is a universally attested cognitive phenomenon that fundamentally shapes both conceptual structures and linguistic expressions in all human languages without exception, in one way or another. Being primarily conceptual, metonymies are not necessarily realized in language, i.e. lexicalized or grammaticalized, or not necessarily realized only in language. One might of course expect that metonymically motivated constructions will be found to be fairly frequent in cross-linguistic terms.
Although metonymy is a universally attested cognitive process, it does not follow, however, that various languages must make use of it in the same way, and in the same contexts. This intuition has been voiced by a number of cognitive linguists pioneering in research on basic conceptual processes such as metaphor and metonymy. Lakoff (1987: 78) , discussing metonymy, was among the first to warn that: "[…] general principles are not the same in all languages, one cannot simply say that anything can stand for anything else in the right context. One needs to distinguish which principles work for which languages." Discussing metonymies of the type The ham sandwich is getting impatient, or Plato is on the top shelf, Fauconnier (1994: 10) observes that there appears to be a lot of variation at different levels: "This implies possible variation from community to community, from context to context, from individual to individual."
Now that a considerable number of insightful studies into metonymy since the late 1990s have uncovered an impressive body of data and led to formulating a number of generalizations by highlighting its more universal aspects (mostly dealing with English material, and tacitly assuming that most high-level generalizations that have been established for English, or any other language that happened to provide the empirical confirmation of theoretical claims, should largely hold for other languages as well), the time seems to be ripening now for tackling the issue of how universal conceptual metonymies are in a wider crosslinguistic perspective.
Such cross-linguistic comparisons could help tease out some new and interesting facts leading to a better understanding of the phenomenon. A similar position is also implicitly entertained by Langacker (1991: 538) when he outlines the range of phenomena that have been handled within the cognitive framework. Regrettably, comparisons of languages with a view to specifically investigating metonymy have been few. This research task seems to have been in a way pre-figured by Kalisz (1983) , although it was not pleaded for openly, and what is even more important, a broader research context is missing there. We recently note a growing interest in this issue, materializing in a series of fine-grained contrastive studies of the use of metonymic models, for example, by and Panther & Thornburg (1999a Thornburg ( & b, 2003 , and by Brdar & Brdar-Szabó (2003) , Brdar-Szabó (2002) , and Brdar-Szabó and Brdar (2003) , to name just a few. These are very promising because they indicate that further efforts of this sort, particularly if paralleled by large-scale typological studies, should help uncover a wealth of hitherto unsuspected facts, correlations, and generalizations, and thus contribute towards filling out and/or revising the general picture.
It has also been shown in recent work on metonymy that its availability in various environments is constrained by an intricate network of factors. In fact, it can be claimed that the only way to actually assess the universality of metonymy is by checking the constraints it is subject to. In Section 3, we have seen that different submetonymies of the PART OF THE-SCENARIO FOR THE WHOLE SCENARIO are used in various languages, and that we need to account for their choosing either the CORE or the AFTER component as the metonymic source. In this Section we would like to show that the choice is based on the cultural model of help that is prevalent in the community in which a given language is spoken. Specifically, we would like to claim that the choice between the CORE or the AFTER component as the metonymic source corresponds to two different cultural models of HELP. For Holland and Quinn:
[c]ultural models are presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behavior in it. (1987: 4) According to d'Andrade (1995) they have a double function: they are used to represent something and to reason with, i.e. provide a blueprint for problem solving as parts of a model can be mentally manipulated in order to solve the problem.
It is generally assumed in cognitive linguistics that the role of conceptual metaphors and metonymies is more basic in understanding than that of cultural models. What is more, it is taken for granted that metaphors and metonymies underlie cultural models. Taking a diametrically opposite stand, Quinn claims: I want to argue further, and I think quite contrary to what Johnson and Lakoff seem to be saying, that metaphorical systems or productive metaphors typically do not structure understandings de novo. Rather, particular metaphors are selected by speakers, and are favored by these speakers, just because they provide satisfying mappings onto already existing cultural understandings. (1991: 65) Our position on this issue is somewhere in the middle in that we assume that metaphors and metonymies can underlie cultural models but also that cultural models can underlie certain metaphors and metonymies in the sense that cultural models may ease the use of metaphors and metonymies, or virtually preclude them (as we show in a series of recent studies, cf. Brdar 2006 Brdar , 2007 Brdar-Szabó, Brdar & Jakobović 2009; Schmidt & Brdar 2008) .
Typically, more than one cultural model is simultaneously available in a linguistic community, and of course, when we consider the situation from a crosslinguistic perspective, we realize that such a complex sociocultural system offers a more realistic way of accounting for cross-cultural and cross-linguistic (as well as sociolinguistic) variation in the use of metaphors and metonymies, i.e. a deeper motivation of a whole range of linguistic phenomena.
As for the cultural models of HELP, claimed above to be responsible for different choice of the metonymic source of the PART OF THE-SCENARIO FOR THE WHOLE SCENARIO metonymy, we stipulate that in languages like Hungarian, Polish, or Slovakian and Czech, the underlying cultural model of help can be characterized as collectivist, while the one more prevalent in German, English, etc., is individualist (cf. Triandis et al 1988 for a similar opposition). The former model emphasizes the preparatory stage and the BEFORE as the metonymic source chosen in the expression of indirectness, which are lexicalized as plural (inclusive) forms of indicative or imperative. The latter is result-oriented, emphasizes the AFTER component, and gets lexicalized by means of impersonal and non-finite forms.
The former model presupposes a benevolent teacher/instructor, solidarity, and supervision, and may be characterized as a low-risk model. The latter presupposes an impersonal, uninvolved model, actually a self-help model (just short of a responsibility disclaimer) that may be characterized as a high-risk one due to the individual responsibility.
Note also that, as far as the collectivist help model is concerned, the four linguistic communities in question are geographically adjacent and that they form a continuous area. At the same time, they once formed part of the Soviet bloc which emphasized the collectivist spirit, discouraging individualism. Further, they were once part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, and still share some cultural and linguistic traits such as the concern for politeness, which is still manifested verbally and/or also in body movements. Witness thus the complex forms of address in Hungarian, a hint of saluting when greeting men and kissing the hand of women in Poland. Hand kissing is retained in Hungary in its verbal form, as a greeting formula, though it is not restricted to women, but to family members and elderly people in general that are perceived as superiors in rank.
The two cultural models of help seem to be in turn motivated by conceptual metaphors (though quite complex ones, so that they might be even considered to be as rich as cultural models in their own right). Refraining from suggesting new conceptual metaphors, we think that the metaphors in question come quite close to the pair of metaphors that Lakoff (2002) claims to underlie American political life, viz. the NURTURING PARENT vs. the STRICT FATHER metaphor. The STRICT FATHER metaphor determines, among other things, when helping other people is moral. Specifically, help is never moral when it interferes with the cultivation of selfdiscipline and individual responsibility. Through his own example, the strict father instills discipline and self-reliance. Self-reliant, morally disciplined adults make the right decisions and prosper. A nurturing parent, on the other hand, shows empathy and believes that support and assistance are beneficial, that they help people thrive, and that people who need help deserve to be helped.
Concluding remarks
Our initial question about the factors motivating the realisation of instructional speech act in cooking recipes can be, in light of the cross-linguistic and crosscultural investigation we performed, answered as follows. The constructions attested in this use in various languages seem to be motivated by complex interplay of cognitive, pragmatic and structural factors.
Starting from the speech-act scenario model by Panther and Thornburg (1997) , we have noted the following tendencies:
• the metonymy of the type CORE COMPONENT FOR THE WHOLE SCENARIO is characteristic of Stage D • the metonymy of the type AFTER COMPONENT FOR THE WHOLE SCENARIO is characteristic of stages E, F and G
We have also realized that the lack of face-threat in cooking recipes makes it possible to go directly to the CORE of the speech act scenario, which explains the cross-linguistic constancy of expression, i.e. the domination of the imperative construction. As for the cross-linguistic differences, i.e. the range of variation found across languages, it turns out that the choice of one of the submetonymies of the PART OF THE-SCENARIO FOR THE WHOLE SCENARIO depends on the cultural model of HELP that is prevalent in the community in which a given language is spoken. Specifically, we have claimed that the choice between the CORE and the AFTER component as the metonymic source corresponds to two different cultural models of HELP. The two cultural models of help seem to be in turn motivated by conceptual metaphors, the NURTURING PARENT and the STRICT FATHER metaphor. In addition to these, we are also aware of the fact that some further aspects must be taken into consideration, such as: the conventionalized meanings of grammatical constructions and their structural make-up (in terms of the number of words and/or morphemes, e.g. whether the imperatives are marked as different from infinitives and indicatives, and how), the range of grammatical constructions available (note, for example, the lack of infinitive constructions in Bulgarian and Macedonian, forcing them to opt for impersonal constructions, or the choice between 1 st and 2 nd person imperatives), selectional restrictions imposed by verbs (how general or how specific they are), strategies available for maintaining topic continuity, the related issue of the ease with which direct objects can be deleted (i.e. ellipted), etc.
